Two crucial processes are discussed; (1) that through which social problems become public issues; and (2) that through which conflicts between competing diagnoses of, and responses to, publicly recognized social problems are resolved. Regularities in these transformations are conceptualized as follows; groups differ in their definitions of social problems according to self-interest, ideology, and social values. For a social problem to become a public issue, a complex political process develops around the activities of the media, officialdom and private interest groups-Similarly, conflicts arise among official authorities, underdog partisans, privileged partisans, policy planners, etc. as to how to respond to the problem. Various strategies for handling the conflicts are seen as generating significant political outcomes for the parties concerned and for the policy process. In sum, the paper serves to point out a whole area of important political considerations in the analysis of social problems.
Graham L. Staines
The analysis of social problems occurs in a political context. This paper begins a political analysis of how social problems are defined, how they are transformed into public issues, how they are subjected to competing analyses and how the conflict between interested parties over these divergent analyses may produce different effects on ooth people and policy. A process is thus envisaged based on the sequence: private or interest group recognition of the social problem; political recognition of the problem as an appropriate issue for public decision; pilblic debate about the causes of the problem; a set of political outcomes of s sequence.
Private Recognition of a Social Problem
The concept of "social problem" applies when wh7,L an ideology designates as an ideal state of affairs, and what is perceived to be the reality, are thought to diverge. Accordingly, what at any time are generally labeled as social problems represent departures from social ideals that stem from dominant or sub-cultural ideologies. Unemployment, for example, is now a social problem because it denotes a state of affairs regarded as markedly less than ideal.
In other centuries, it was not considered a problem because it violated no ideal conception of society. Recognition of a problem, however, does not necessarily denote a desire for broadly conceived change; this depends on one's interests and outloolc.
Thus one perception u a problem may imply a need for -2-"fine-tuning" a given status quo, while another may entail qualitative change (see Mannheim, 1936 , for his distinction between ideology and utopia).
The perspective on social problems provided by the sociology of knowledge suggests linkages between problem perceptions and more or less stable constellations of social interest. In more pragmatic terms, different problem perceptions are held by different social groups. Economic class provides the most obvious examples. Thus, we expect, and find, a business view of unemployment and a labor view; a business view of inflation and a labor view.
In any given social system, some views, attached to dominant interests, will tend to dominate problem definition. As American society defines the business of society as business, there tends to be a prevailing problem definition more consonant with the business view. The result is what the Italian Marxist
Gramsci calls a capitalist "hegemony" in culture. (Gremsci, 1967) The logic of the concept of social problem suggests that group differences in problem perceptions will originate; in part, from differences in social ideals.
Groups diverse, then, in their conceptions of what is desirable for a "proper" or "good" social order, and this divergence May be quite innocent of conscious selfishness. Middle class views on alcohol, urban machine politics, the pattern of urban growth all contrast sharply, for example, with the working class and Catholic and minority perspectives on these matters (Gans, 1968) .
Two examples seem pertinent here. In The Urban Villa942 (1962) , Gans des- cribes the South End of Boston as a relatively cohesive, satisfying social environment for its working class Catholic residents. By the formal definitions of the city and by federal urban renewal standards, however, the structures of that community were blighted. The structures were torn down, after belated 3- attempts to prevent this, and the residents dispersed to surroundings, sounder physically, but less satisfying socially. In a second example, Gusfeld (1963) analyses the Temperance Movement as a "symbolic crusade" by which Protestant middle class activists, through the syri_olic victory of Prohibition, asserted their waning cultural dominance over the Catholic and urban minority challengers to their former hegemony.
Simply put, what is a "problem" for one group, is a mundane part of life for another (cf. Mills, 1943 ).
Group differences in problem perceptions may not be attributed in a simple way solely to different social ideals. Perceptions of reality, the other component of problem perceptions, also provide a source of disagreement. Once more, interest and ideology make the connection between group cleavages on the one hand, and views about social regularities or facts, on the other. The prominent example is again economic. Working class and labor views of unemployment assume worker motivation and address themselves to the structure of opportunity or lack of it --for work. Business views tend to emphasize more clearly the problem of motivation of the individual worker, the sk'ls 1,1e h:, her, and take as open whether people would work if they were not forced to.
The upshot is that the ostensible conflicts over facts and empirical generalizations which surround a given issue are frequently based upon at least two other aspects of problem definition: the self-interest of parties to controversies, and the values they may variously hold.
Some would, doubtless, query whether the process of assessing social reality need be as debatable and arbitrary as the present analysis might suggest.
Indeed, the modern era offers the rhetoric of science and objectivity, and the scientific method, as a means to arbitrate many such disputes.
If a critical experiment can be performed, or a definitive body of data collected, the -4--scientist, presumably, may say, "Regardless of one's position on the proposed policy, these are the facts of the matter, and I can prove it." Yet, in the process of social problem definition and social policy formation, face to face confrontation with disconfirming facts is not necessarily frequent or structured; and much survey and experimental work shows the lengths to which individuals will go in avoiding confrontation with such informational input. Legitimacy may be created, in similar manner, by following up a press conference, e.g., about rising unemployment with man-on-the-street interviews at the lines in front of a state unemployment compensation o7f:ce.
Officialdom also participates in the shaping of social or public issues through its many spokesmen: aspiring politicians, elected officials, bureaucrats, the judiciary, etc. Missile gaps, the threat of communism and domestic subversion are all, as social issueL, largely the creatures of official pronowilcements.
They are official images of the social order. 'President Nixon's bitter anti-busing statement was circulated to millions last week by newspapers, radio and television. But it went almost unnoticed that the very next day the school superintendent of Harrisburg, Pa., refuted the Nixon position point by point, in an account of the actual experience of that city.
This was a classic demonstration of the extent to which the American press --print and electronic --merely react to the statements of important officials rather than trying to make an independent judgment on the facts. Mr. Nixon's distortions were trumpeted in headlines, because he is President; the facts put forward by Dr. David H. Porter were ignored, because he was not 'newsworthy' enough."
Thirdly, even when the media officially place politicians in adversary positions, the opposition is more apparent than real.
Thus, press conferences are -7-construed as forums for press criticism of government. Yet the norms of courtesy that constrain questions, the format of the conferences (e.g., no
follow up questions), and the control exercised by the officials involved, all weight the outcome in favor of even a semi-alert government spokesmen.
The acquiescence of the media to the interests of government is, perhaps, best demonstrated by one example which includes all three factors: handing out the news selectively, stressing the news value of (and thus partially legitimating) official statements, and placing the opposition at a disadvan- of the newspaper and media industry, the appearance of panic was able to skew the political system's response to the post-War era (Rogin, 1967) .
Outside the jurisdiction of media and government, the role of private interests groups in labeling Focial issues should not be underestimated.
Crenson (1970), for example, assembled evidence to show that indu,tries with a reputation for power can prevent certain social problems from becoming social issues.
Industry generally favors urban renewal (it can be made profitable)
but resists pollution as social issues (it costs industry money). The more resources industry has available, the more they can influence what becomes a social issue.
Clearly, the transformation from social problem (privately recognized)
to social issue (publicly recognized) has many determinants and defies precise statement at the moment. Two strategic resources, nevertheless, do seem critical in the contest over whose issues will gain a place on the public agenda.
The first resource, legitimate authority, may stem from the charisma of office (for officials), of achievement (for businessmen), of expertise (for scientists, etc.), or of virtual representation (as in the role played by the late Dr. M.L. King).
In ordinary language, these types of charisma form some of the bases of respect for the people whose words "count". The other sort of resources is more concrete, more material, more economic. It is the ability to impose one's view of an issue upon the public by virtue of one's position.
Thus, in the Northwest corner of Indiana, Japanese steel is an issue because the steel companies make it one; because their agenda, by virtue of their resources, their power and their very existence, makes it everybody's issue.
Success in bringing a social problem to public attention does not always entail the ability to control the dominant definition of the problem. As Crenson (1970) noted recently and the politicial scientist Schattschneider (1960) did years ago, there is inherent risk in bringing an issue to a public arena.
For, the more participants involved, the more various the interests, cultures, classes, and organizational bases of these participants, the more difficult it is for the originating party to maintain control of the definition of what is at stake.
It is an indicator of great political power when a group is able to raise an issue and see it brought to some sort of resolution in the terms of definition originally proposed. That such attempts are regularly made and fail is an indicator of the critical nature definitions play in formation of alliances.
Conflicting Analyses of Social Problems
A variety of causal interpretations of social problems are always available.
Elsewhere (Staines, 1971) , the distinction between attributing a social problem to situational (or system) factors and blaming it on the persons involved is elaborated, and we alluded to it earlier while discussing unemployment.
A large number of cognitive and psychological variables are shown to influence the choice of situational versus personal attributions.
In this paper,,however, the concern lies with political determinants of attributional analyses of social problems. Various political actors and agencies, it may be argued, have strong political interests in selecting different types of attribution. Five classes of political actors will be considered in turn, as ideal types, with a consequent risk of exaggerating the attributional differences between them.
-10-a)
Authorities by virtue of "office."
Authorities in Gamson's (1968) terms have a political interest in justifying and maintaining their administration (which may be somewhat different from the social interests they "represent"). Specifically, they will want to show:
that things are generally going well ("You've never had it so good");
that the problems that do exist are not the fault of the authorities or of the Unemployment and poverty stem from a deficit of motivation (or virtue) and from malingering rather than from market and structural conditions. Sometimes, however, authorities depart from definitions of social problems in person-blame terms. This is presently the case with liberal Democrats and moderate Republicans. Their rhetoric has gradually come to portray the conditions of blacks in more structural, system-blame terms (Kerner, 1968) . The second explanation applies only to the systemic rhetoric of out-ofpower elites such as the Democrats in the present period. These quasi-authorities tend to become much more system-blame oriented in their rhetoric and their oppositional proposals. They challenge the adequacy of the incumbents world view, its linkages to policy, and its compassion for the plight of large masses of unblemished, but poorly treated people. However, once the "outs" have focused on a symbolic standard-bearer, e.g., their Presidential candidate, they will tend once again to contest on the basis of the personal attributes of their man versus the incumbent. Although presented as alternative explanations of system-blame by authorities, the two hypotheses cited may each be partially accurate. Underdog Partisans
Underprivileged or low status partisans involved in a social problem have a political stake in system blame. By using external attributions, underdogs avoid the self-blame and inertia which no social or political movement can tolerate and they place the problem at the doo step of the authorities with a demand for speedy official action: social movnients involving Ameri_can blacks blame white racism, institutional racism, racial discrimination, structural poverty and unemploymmt, defective housing and education for the plight of their constituency. The movement for women's rights charges sex discrimination and tries to undermine explanations of income differentials in terms of innate sex differences.
c)
Privileged Partisans
Privileged partisans take two tacks; first, as in the previously cited case of business groups,they attempt to deny that a problem is an appropriate one for public decision. In our social system, this first line of defense against encroachment on privilege will frequent17 involve the prerogatives of private enterprise and property. For example, it was decades before the right of the state to force nondiscrimination in privately owned public facilities was consensual enough to become statutory; and it is still not consensual enough to be enforced.
The second tack of more privileged partisans is similar to that frequently taken by authorities. They urge the perspective that personal characteristics of subpopulations, usually the less than equal, are responsible for disturbing behavior.
Thus, either problem behavior cannot or should not be handled by the state, or the state should focus programmatically on bringing specified groups of individuals up to standard. Frequently, however, suppression cannot be just''-ed on strategic grounds (i.e., it won't work), and staffers and planners fei obliged to take more positive action. Ameliorative action may move ther attributions in the direction of the system-blame perspective of relevant partisans but not so far that they discredit the administration of their political bosses.
Policy advisors and planners also share certain bureaucratic interests. On the second point, agencies may even be concerned to define the problem so that action by them is appropriate while interventions by rival agencies would be inappropriate (cf. Lennard and Bernstein, 197l) . Marris and Rein (1969) cite the example of competition in 1960 13:atiblan two federal bureaucracies --N1MH and the Children's Bureau --for fumris -from a. Congress increasinglŷ alarmed at the rise in delinquency:
"NIMH was seeking to develop a policy of comprehensive community action projects, aimed at the complex social causes of delinquency... The Children's Bure.au hoped that new legislation would gra t it a statutory authority equal to its rival through which it c Id promote technical assistance, studies, and demonstrations of ncw methods of correction." A personal attribution for a social problem may thus permit them to mark down a program's failure to the extensive pathology of the target group rather than any short-sightedness in the planning and execution of their own programs (cf. Caplan, 1971) . On the other hand, bureaucratic agencies must also be forward looking. The theorist should be able to chart the strategic needs of the agency as perceived by its effective leadership; that is, different needs of the moment may entail different predilections for attribution. An agency head, for example, in a city with a black majority and a black mayor given to the rhetoric of black pride, is not apt to be too outspoKen about the alleged weakness of the black family.
But there are, of course, other factors besides internal agency exigencies.
Governmental agencies tend to build up stable client relations with stable interest groups (Lingwood and Ross, 1971) . While some of these, for example the privileged partisans in a controversy in which they relate closely to a city renewal agency, may contend in favor of person-blame, other clients of other agencies may contend for system-blame attribution. Thus, not only a knowledge of the agency needs, but also an analysis of client demands, power, and their interactions, are necessary for prediction of agency attribution. Anti-war spokesmen were not citing the polls when they formed a minority bu:
now claim that the fact that "the majority of the American people want out of Vietnam" is a major reason why the administration should extricate American forces from the war. Thus, while some ideological commitments to personal wersus situational attributions may extend beyond considerations of interest, many which purport to, do not.
Outcomes of Conflict between Diagnoses
Since causal diagnoses of social problems are reached by different people in different political situations, conflict between alternative patterns of attribution becomes inevitable. Ordinary citizens may disagree among themselves,as may members of government. Indeed, the controversial nature of problem diagnosis suggests one important reason why social problems so often become public issues.
Of particular interest here is the conflict over problem diagnosis between, on the one hand, governmental actors and agencies including policy advisors and planners and, on the other, the target population involved in the social problem. The conflict usually involves some mixture of confrontation and bargaining.
.1 7' Relevant descriptive person-blame myths about the way American society operates include: Horatio Alger, and the openness of opportunity; the efficacy of education for career advancement, and so on.
There is an element of truth in these mythic formulations, to be sure. But the role they play in negotiation is always to put the final burden of proof on the less than equal.
On the normative side, equality of opportunity to all the education a person may fruitfully use, for example, has become the more or less publicly accepted rhetoric of urban managers. Willhelm (1970) has pointed out that equality of opportunity in an economy depending on declining amounts of unskilled labor, and escalating amounts of technical skill,provides a superb way both to end discrimination and to do away with the possibility of achievement of equality between the races. Beyond their symbolic strategies, authorities also have at -1 9-their disposal economic resources and action programs that may be promised to the target group.
In their turn, the underdog partisans involved bring to the bargaining process the capacity to make trouble and agitate as .tit as the support and sympathy of allied groups. But cultural myths, too, may also act as resources for the less than equal, as is illustrated by an examination of the speed with which two recent social movements have developed. The first is the movement for racial equality and black liberation, and the second is the women's liberation movement.
In the first instance, of course, Myrdal's formulation (1944) is very much to the point. Except for the deep South, nowhere in America was classic, genetic racism a legitimate social ideology with which to respond to black demands for equality. Little by little,the definitions of system blame have gained currency. Individualism is now the last line of ideological resistance to black demands for compensatory or egalitarian programs. One of the resources which has helped in the intense struggle of the Sixties has been those parts of the mythic structure of America which took equality of opportunity as a real condition; when confronted with clear instances of normative inconsistency, we saw change accelerate. The weakness, of course, of this aspect of change in the political system is that it works as long as the system perceives the demand as one within the consensus. Since the condition of black people is in many ways unprecedented, and the corrective modes more radical, the system has taken to creating pariahs of those groups who take the logical, but fateful steps outside the pale of that consensus. Thus, the Kerner Commission (1968) attacks white racism and various structural conditions of life in the ghetto, but the Justice Department persecutes the Black Panthers with terrible vengeance.
Similar observations may be made of the women's movement. Almost nowhere in officialdom can outright genetic arguments about women's inferiority be made, despite some talk of the relevance of genetic "differences." There is little or no moral ground for antagonists to stand on in resisting equal pay for equal work or other apparently commonsensical demands. Consequently, the movement has been able to literally explode, holding terrific moral power wherever it focuses its efforts. In a certain sense, the women's movement has cornered the moral resource market on a number of issues. However, when it moves beyond the consensual American myth of equality within the nuclear family and challenges such sacred concepts as marriage, lady-like behavior, women as sex objects, the nuclear family itself, etc., the movement cannot gain the same momentum for its own version of what a really free situation would be like.
As a movement for cultural consistency it is powerful; as a movement for cultural change it is controversial.
When authorities and partisans focus their respective resources on bargaining, the ensuing process includes, in addition to negotiation over material and more substantive matters, a process that Scheff (1968) terms reality negotiation, that is, negotiation about the problem diagnosis or correct attribution.
The compromise on attributions may be achieved via different routes: a heterogeneous but official commission (e.g., the Kerner Commission) to define the social problem, cooptation by the authorities of some of the target group --often more "moderate" leaders, or a decision to refer the issue to a third party (e.g. , the judiciary). whether inflation is attributable to price-increases (labor) or wage-increases (management). In this case,the availability of distributable resources, and the institutionalization of the process,act so as to defuse potentially explosive conflict.
The result of the conflict between the authorities and the target group may generate significant outcomes for both parties and the policy process. The authorities may gain political stability and a cessation of challenges to their legitimacy. The target group may gain official resources and, in the case of agreed to situational attributions, influence over official decisions.
If they compromise on an attributional pattern, though, the members of the target group may be affected.
Thus an acceptance of a person-blame diagnosis as part of a negotiated deal may encourage self-blame and hence self-hatred in the group.
Some experimental evidence uncovers the political dangers of these negative self-attributions. Costanzo (1970) , using children as experimental subjects, has demonstrated a relation between self-blame and conformity to peer pressure.
The finding suggests that authorities,who can induce underdog partisans to internalize negative labels and biame themselves, may also command, on the part -22-of disadvantaged citizens, conformity to the wishes of authorities. On the other hand, if the target group can force acceptance of a system-blame orientation, it can elevate the self-esteem of members and hence their political efficacy, aspirations, and activism.
The policy outcomes of the conflict are specified less easily. One hypothesis ties policy effectiveness to the accuracy of the problem diagnosis.
Thus, if inordinate emphasis is assigned to personal factors in the diagnosis of a social problem, the resulting politics and programs will founder against situational impediments unacknowledged in the diagnosis, e.g., many juvenile delinquency programs (Powers and Witmer, 1951) . Other hypotheses about problem diagnosis and policy output may be ventured: e.g., situational diagnoses may lead to more policy, more programs and greater outlay of official resources (cf. the widespread view that political liberals in government institute more social programs than their conservative counterparts). This paper has moved over the surface of a number of disciplines and problems, perhaps too rapidly. We hope it serves the modest purpose of pointing out a whole area of important political considerations in the analysis of social problems. It has indicated a series of points at which the transformation of problem to issue may be effected, and it has suggested who might make or resist those attempts, and how. Some critics may contend that the definitional process is not as potent as we suspect, and that the larger forces of class structure, class interest and class power work their way through the political and cultural process regardless of these, perhaps microprocesses. On the other hand, if the notion of a class "hegemony" in culture (Gramsci, 1967) does have validity, then our review should be consistent with it. The next time our readers hear the phrase welfare state, for example, it is our intention that they should ask, "whOse?"
